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I. INTRODUCTION
Public policy, like metaphysics, does well to follow Occam's Razor,
entia non sunt multiplicanda praeter necessitatem: no unnecessary
multiplication of entities. It has a specific public policy corollary: that
explanations ought to delve no deeper than necessary in pursuit of policy
t Professor of Law, Washington College of Law, American University; Fellow of
the Hoover Institution, Stanford University; and member of the Hoover Institution Task
Force on National Security and Law. B.A., 1983, University of California at Los
Angeles; J.D., 1986, Harvard Law School. I am grateful to Wayne State University Law
School and to Wayne State Professors Brad Roth and Gregory Fox for inviting me to
participate in the March 26, 2007 discussion "Rethinking Legal Approaches to Terrorism
and Mass Atrocity Symposium," which gave rise to this essay. Thanks also to Professor
Madeline Morris of Duke University Law School and Steven Ratner of University of
Michigan Law School who were the other two participants in this event.
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and, most of all, ought to avoid seeking ultimate foundations in political
things. Why? Because the deeper one goes into explanations for policy,
the harder it becomes, at least in a complex and plural democratic
society, to find sufficient agreement necessary to implement policy. If
policy depended in every case, or even in very many cases, on deep
political agreement, there would be very little policy, or at least very
little successfully implemented policy. Indispensable issues of the day
would await the resolution of foundational political issues, which would
never come. Hence the heuristic principle of lex parsimoniae.'
Alas, the remarks that follow do not abide that good counsel. The
premise of this essay is, on the contrary, that policy responses by the
United States to the threat of transnational, jihadist terrorism depend
remarkably upon foundational political issues, upon which there seems to
be less and less agreement. Some of these issues are ones of fundamental
values regarding how the polity might permissibly respond to terrorist
threats to security. Others are ones of fundamental factual assessment of
the nature and magnitude and probability of threat. Yet, as 9/11 recedes
in memory, both the American public and, even more, the American
governing elites, share less, rather than more, agreement as to the
fundamental issues regarding terrorism. The coming of a new
administration-whether Republican or Democratic is unknown at this
writing-tends to cause a paralysis of policy because it is unclear where
a new administration will go, in part because the fundamental
foundations of policy are unclear.
For some years now, once past the initial shock of 9/11, the United
States has elided the problem of disagreement over foundations of policy
by two interlinked mechanisms. On the one hand, the executive branch
has offered stem rhetoric as to the global and long-term nature of the
threat-a strategic vision of a long-term war on terror, extended in both
time and space. In the initial period following 9/11, the executive
undertook a strategic response based around that view of things. On the
other hand, while its rhetoric continues largely unabated in the vein of
grand strategy, its concrete actions, after a high water mark of executive
power, have been trimmed and cut back, partly by other organs of
government, the courts especially, and partly by shifting views of
governing elites. Whether any of these shifts is a good idea or a bad idea
as a matter of policy is beyond the scope of this discussion. More
important to this essay is that U.S. policy is now highly fragmented, ad
!. See generally CASS SUNSTEIN, WORST-CASE SCENARIOS (Harvard Caravan 2007).
Although I am here "riffing" off of Cass Sunstein, I am not appealing here to the
apparatus of Cass Sunstein's "incompletely theorized agreements." For our purposes, we
do not need such elaborate theoretical machinery.
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hoc, a matter of temporary and tactical coalitions, and not guided by
much that could be called an overarching view of the foundations of
national security policy. Whether on detainee policy, surveillance, or
many other areas, policy is narrow and cramped.
The United States needs greater coherence in addressing terrorism.
The current lack of coherence, however, is not simply about the much
analyzed problems of institutional mission, will, coordination, resources,
and other technocratic and bureaucratic issues, important as they are. The
lack of a coherent counterterrorism policy stems from disagreements that
are deeper than mere operational policy alone. Some of these
disagreements stem from genuinely profound differences in how to see
fundamental issues of risk, how to assess risk and what to do about risks,
what magnitudes of damage are worth what kinds of responses, and
whether a counterterrorism policy ought to be motivated by a larger
strategy. In a moment in which there is a change of administration, the
foundational questions ought to be on the table. Most, perhaps nearly all
of the time, discussion should confine itself to less weighty phenomena,
in order to get to actionable policy. There are other moments-and this is
one-where the sclerosis of action is occasioned by deeper conflicts that
ought to be squarely on the table.
This essay takes up certain aspects of threat assessment, risk
assessment, cost benefit analysis, strategy and tactics, as exemplary in
offering a foundational assessment as to disagreements in surface policy.
The discussion aims merely at showing that there are foundational
disagreements, what some of those disagreements might be with respect
to risk and threat assessment, and what the implications of such
disagreements might be. The discussion of these particular topics is not
exhaustive and, moreover, there are other equally momentous issues that
might, and should, be taken up. All such issues, for example, are the
nature of the enemy; the origin and growth ofjihad; and the relationship
of jihad to Islam as a religion, and its possibly syncretic relation to
Western ideologies, or the economic ordering of transnational terrorism.
Other topics include questions of both personal and geographic
boundaries of the political community that policies and actions are
designed to protect; the importance of safety as against liberties; or
whether the United States owes, as a moral matter, the same juridical
protections to foreign terrorists that it owes to its own citizens. Still other
topics for consideration may be the relationship of war generally, and
wars in Afghanistan and Iraq specifically, to undermining terrorist
organizations; and, of course, the question of whether any of the
foregoing is worth answering, because they all imply the virtues of a
larger, strategic nature of policies responding to terrorism. Perhaps that is
itself the deep strategic error, and the correct response is a determinedly
20081
THE WAYNE LAW REVIEW
ad hoc one that refuses to look too far forward for fear of losing its eye
on the immediate ball.
The present discussion addresses none of those questions, but instead
uses risk assessment and cost benefit analysis as an example of what
such an inquiry into foundations might be. As to conclusions, well, they
are decidedly modest. Foundational inquiries have only limited utility in
complicated democratic policy making, even if it is a moment when they
are appropriate and indeed necessary. They cannot really induce
agreement as such; what they can do is indicate where the fissures,
ordinarily papered over by the political process, lie. They can remind the
participants that the disagreements mean that things that one might have
thought were settled are, after all, contestable and contested. The final
outcome of such an inquiry is necessarily, but ironically, a re-papering
over of the foundational disagreements into a new institutional and
policy settlement that, at best, might have come through the exercise
with a greater understanding of what cannot be done by consensus-
because there is none-and what, if it happens, must be by nakedly
majoritarian democratic legislative process or by the exercise of
executive powers. This kind of discussion helps lay bare where and on
what matters the polity does not act by consensus, but instead relies on
political imposition of one kind or another. Quotidian, actual policy
comes about not in the presence of profound foundational disagreement,
but in its cautionary remembrance about agreement and consensus that
will not be achieved.
That is all that this essay seeks to do-to offer an example, at a
dismayingly high (from the standpoint of practical policy) level of
abstraction, of philosophical, conceptual and methodological
disagreements that today motivate and de-motivate government
responses to jihadist terror. It is finally a very modest aim, because it
invites the opening of this discussion and then suggests that, now
modestly informed as to that on which we lack consensus, and in the
interests of actual policy, we close it again. Too much foundationalism in
democratic policy-making: that way lies madness.
II. SUCCESSFUL TERROR PREVENTION POLICY OR HAPPY FORTuITY,
AND ANYWAY How Do You KNOW?
A. What to Make of Counterterrorism Success Since 9/11 ?
Today, nearly seven years after 9/11, the war on terror, which may
well no longer be called that in polite policy company, is a vast
efflorescence of government. It flourishes. Yet, on measures of rational
operational performance, it is ill-coordinated, incoherent and, in the eyes
[Vol. 54:505
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of skeptics, questionably effective in pursuit of an unfathomable goal. A
formidable array of policies, laws, regulations, executive orders, budget
provisions, bureaucracies, agencies, and institutions seek to analyze
terrorism and terrorist organizations; anticipate threats; collect
intelligence and inform decision-makers; make available actions and
resources ranging from electronic monitoring to undertaking war;
prevent hijackings and terrorist entry to the United States; secure the
ports; detain suspected terrorists and interrogate them whether at home or
abroad; interdict terrorist sources of funding; coordinate intelligence and
action with our allies; cajole our semi-allies; intimidate states that harbor
or sponsor terrorists; prevent the linkup of terrorists and weapons of
mass destruction; provide civil emergency response in case of a
successful terrorist attack; identify the terrorists who would attack us and
stop them; and, well, defend the Constitution of the United States against
all enemies, domestic and foreign.
What then are we to make of the fact that the United States has not
suffered a successful homeland attack since 2001? There have been plots
and attempts, according to law enforcement and intelligence authorities.
These include the Richard Reid "shoe bomber" attempt to bring down an
aircraft, not long after 9/11.2 They also include much more recent plots,
authorities report, such as the 2006 case in which suspects are alleged to
have plotted to attack the military base at Fort Dix, New Jersey.3 They
also appear to include plots and attempts not publicly known, aimed at
United States territory. Former Bush administration officials recount the
steady drumbeat of what former Office of Legal Counsel head Jack
Goldsmith has called the "harrowing" daily flow of threat assessments
from around the world. These officials' fears are fueled, he says, by
"their knowledge of terrorists' aims and the infinite number of targets,
and by their relative ignorance about when, where, or how the next attack
will occur." 4 The current Attorney General, Michael Mukasey, has said
how surprised he has been by the seriousness of the flow of daily
threats. 5
2. See, e.g., Shoe Bomb Suspect to Remain in Custody, CNN.coM, Dec. 25, 2001,
available at http://archives.cnn.com/2001[US/12/24/investigation.plane/index.html (last
visited Oct. 20, 2008).
3. See, e.g., Dan Eggen & Dale Russakoff, Six Charged in Plot to Attack Fort Dix,
WASH. POST., May 9, 2007, at A01.
4. JACK GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY: LAW AND JUDGMENT INSIDE THE
BUSH ADMINISTRATION, 186-87 (WW Norton 2007).
5. See Terry Frieden, Mukasey "Surprised" by Scope of Terrorist Threats,
CNN.coM, Mar. 21, 2008 available at http://www.cnn.com/2008/POLITICS/03/21/-
mukasey.terrorism (last visited Oct. 20, 2008).
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Despite such great contingencies, however, US governmental
response to the palpable threats of terrorism, whether at home or abroad,
at the strategic level of undermining terrorist organizations or the tactical
level of preventing a particular attack, plausibly have at least had the
effect of staving off a new homeland attack such as 9/11--or, worse, a
9/11 with weapons of mass destruction. Even if institutional activity to
counterterrorism is (as is practically inevitable in a large, complicated,
bureaucratic yet also democratic government and society such as the
United States) haphazard and disorganized by the rationalist standards of
modem management theory, perhaps there is some benefit, some
overlapping protection, conferred by the organic growth of counter
terrorism responses. Friedrich Hayek, the great economist and political
philosopher, once remarked that the nature of capitalism was its
seemingly organic, asymmetric growth-so untidy and inelegant that
seemingly it could not possibly be as efficient or effective as state-
planned economies-but that in fact the organic nature of the growth, its
sheer opportunism, was its strength and the source of its efficiency.6
Perhaps something like that might be said of the effectiveness of
America's tangled policies and institutions of counterterrorism-
particularly since terrorism itself grows opportunistically.
Skeptics will correctly note, however, that it is not so easy to show
causation for why a possible event has not happened, and it is too easy to
reach the conclusion that the lack of a successful attack since 9/11 shows
the effectiveness of US counterterrorism policies and institutions. There
are plausible alternative hypotheses. In particular, the threat of terrorism,
the skeptics say, was never as large as the post-9/l 1 environment made it
out to be. The likelihood, particularly of a massive follow-up attack, was
never very large. Some people conjoin this skepticism to a quasi-
conspiracy theory; that if the threat was not so large, but the response so
overwhelming, it must be in the service of some other, hidden
government agenda. Goldsmith recounted one such dinner party
encounter with Harvard academics in 2004. The consensus at the
Cambridge dinner table (minus Goldsmith) was that the "government's
reactions to 9/11 were pretextual attempts to expand presidential
power."
7
Even without invoking conspiracies of hidden governmental agendas
in bad faith, however, skeptical assessments of the risks posed by
terrorism often correctly add the position that, in any case, public safety
is not the only issue. Civil liberties and human rights matter as well. If
6. See generally FRIEDRICH HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM 1 (2nd ed. 2006) (1944).
7. GOLDSMITH, supra note 4, at 185.
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safety gains are properly set against liberty costs, then many
counterterrorism policies, programs, and institutions-Guantanamo,
waterboarding, warrantless wiretapping, etc.-are not justified.
Those reaching such a conclusion must themselves respond, on the
other hand, to a certain skepticism from the other direction. Are they
truly empirical skeptics about the safety risks posed by terrorism, who in
good faith attempt to weigh up to competing liberal values-safety and
liberty? Or are they instead covert moral absolutists who do not actually
give any actual weight to the value of safety, but are not willing to
publicly say so? Kantian moral purity is a perfectly honorable position,
but if it is indeed one's position, rather than a genuine weighing up of
competing moral values, one should honorably say so. Why? Because
very few of the rest of us are actually pure Kantians and we do expect
that safety will be weighed along with civil liberties and human rights;
and if one's position is otherwise, one must say so.
8
B. Assumptions Behind the Assumptions in the War on Terror
The evaluation of risk, competing liberal values, what constitutes
success in counterterrorism and to what one should attribute it, and other
such abstractions quickly carry us far away from in-the-trenches
discussion about what counterterrorism policy, law, and institutions
should be and how, in a practical sense, we can get there. Behind the
institutional and surface policy questions lies a whole other layer of
assumptions about the nature of the counterterrorism enterprise. For a
long time it was possible, indeed prudent, to see that layer of
fundamental assumptions as mostly a distraction, an academic luxury. It
was a bit of a vacation from such concrete tasks as answering what
constitutes torture or illegal interrogation and, more generally, what
should Congress legislate as policy, what should the courts mandate, and
many other ground-level questions that, while obviously raising
fundamental philosophical and conceptual issues, did not require
addressing them directly in day-to-day decision-making.
Sometimes it is useful to ignore deeper differences because nothing
more than intellectual purity turns on them. In other cases, the inability to
generate workable policy stems from unacknowledged deeper
differences, and one cannot get anywhere without addressing them. I
have already alluded to two such differences in surface policy that are
causally a function of irreconcilable deep assumptions that can serve as
examples. One is the clash between a covert Kantianism followed by
8. See generally Benjamin Wittes, Terrorism, the Military, and the Courts, POL'Y
REv., June 1, 2007, at 21-22.
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some civil liberties and human rights advocates and a loose pluralist-
value consequentialism followed by more or less everyone else. The
inability to reach agreement on important concrete issues stems, most
likely, from deep and quite possibly irreconcilable moral differences. A
second is the assessment of risk. If, for example, you believe that the
possibility of another 9/11 attack, let alone a weapons of mass
destruction (WMD) terrorist attack, on an American city is smaller by
orders of magnitude than US policy, the government, and the public
assumes, then you will surely think the current war on terror is not just
irrational but quite mad.
Thus, what you think policy should be in concrete matters such as
whether there should be detentions at Guantanamo, or military
commissions instead of regular civilian court trials of alleged terrorists,
or coercive interrogations, or wars against regimes incubating terrorist
organizations, or Predator missile strikes against suspected Al Qaeda
targets in third countries, or wholesale and very expensive screening of
banking transactions to interdict terrorist financing, or other crucial
counterterrorism issues of the day-to-day turns out to depend in no small
part on such abstract questions as how you assess risk, or your abstract
philosophical commitments to stronger or weaker versions of moral
rights, or many other abstractions. For most of us, quotidian practicalities
count for a lot. But daily arguments over practical surface aspects of
policy for combating terror are protracted and bitter, and yet do not ever
seem to settle things, precisely because for many of the key participants,
there is no agreement on the much deeper questions.
III. MAGNITUDE AND LIKELIHOOD
A. Assessing Terrorist Risks
A few months ago, my review of Jack Goldsmith's The Terror
Presidency appeared in the Times Literary Supplement, a London book
review read largely by intellectuals and academics around the English-
speaking world.9 Reader reaction to the review, which addressed many
highly controversial issues such as executive power and the Justice
Department torture memos, surprisingly focused almost exclusively on a
single remark made in passing. "Many people today," I wrote in the
review, "believe that the terror threat is overrated, the problem is to
,manage' rather than defeat it." Anecdotal, to be sure, but most of us
have heard, and quite possibly think exactly that, this view is quite
9. Kenneth Anderson, Going it Alone, TIMES LIT. SupP. (London), Dec. 21 and 28,
2007, at 32-33 (reviewing GOLDSMITH, supra note 4).
[Vol. 54:505
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prevalent.10 A goodly number of people emailed to comment on the
article, mainly to say that Goldsmith's book, although a true reflection of
his experience, is not real; it. is merely indicative of a great deal of
government hoopla over a wildly exaggerated risk. Because it is wildly
exaggerated, Goldsmith's book, riveting as it is to read, is rendered
substantively irrelevant as a proposal for rational policy.
Such views, often eloquently expressed, represent, in my estimation,
the mainstream and momentum, the moving average, of today's elite
opinion in the United States. These readers were undeniably fascinated
by Goldsmith's descriptions of an entire government still in thrall, years
after 9/11, to daily risk assessments of terrorist plots, or the idea that
planes might today come hurtling out of the sky, or more anthrax might
be spread by mail around an American city or a city subway bombed."
Yet their fascination was removed from and not with actual policy.
Rather, regarding the administration as a dangerous echo chamber for its
own inordinate fears-a positive feedback machine ratcheting itself up
into bureaucratic hysteria, they saw Goldsmith's book not as reflecting
exterior reality but instead as a window into a dangerously closed world.
They were fascinated, yes, but not by what Goldsmith purported to
describe-government responding to an external threat under conditions
of radical uncertainty-but instead by what they saw as an exhibition in
institutional madness, a consciousness turned in upon itself and creating
its own unreality. '
2
One cannot really get to other issues of counterterrorism policy
without making assessments of risk. 13 Hence, the question of how one
should make those assessments of risk, as a matter of method; the
selection of method colors outputs. If the government's risk assessments
are systematically exaggerated-intentionally or unintentionally-then
the vast resources spent on counterterrorism are a waste and in many
ways counterproductive. Moreover, tradeoffs of civil liberties and rights
10. See, e.g., Bret Stephens, Global View: An Inordinate Fear of Terrorism? WALL
ST. J., Mar. 4, 2008, at A16.
11. See Clive Crook, Just Brainless, Mr. Bush, FT.cOM, Oct. 15, 2007, available at
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/34275ce0-7ab9-11 dc-9bee-0000779fd2ac.html (last visited
Oct. 20, 2008) (stating that he had read the book overnight in a single sitting, but was not
especially convinced that the risks were so great as government made them out to be).
12. REMY DE GOURMONT, SIXTINE, quoted in BLAISE CENDRARS, MORAVAGINE
epigraph (Alan Brown, trans., Peter Owen 1968) (1926).
13. Those seeking a good non-technical introduction to the fundamental ideas of risk,
presented as intellectual history, might consult PETER L. BERNSTEIN, AGAINST THE GODS:
THE REMARKABLE STORY OF RISK (John Wiley & Sons 1996); see also Kenneth
Anderson, The Uses and Abuses of Risk Management: How Men Learnt to Bet Against
the Gods, TIMES Lrr. SUPP., (London) Feb. 21, 1997 (reviewing PETER L. BERNSTEIN,
AGAINST THE GODS: THE REMARKABLE STORY OF RISK (John Wiley & Sons Inc. 1996)).
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premised on terrorism's risks to public safety and national security might
then be wrong, whether they be provisions of the Patriot Act(s), or
surveillance legislation, or airport security, or so many other laws,
regulations, and policies since 9/11. The costs of being wrong about the
systematic exaggeration or misperception of risk might, on the other
hand, be catastrophic.
American society appears, seven years after 9/11, at a peculiar point
with respect to risk assessment. American elites-this country's
intellectuals, academics, policy analysts, politicians, across a wide range
of activities-appear to have concluded that risks are severely
exaggerated, and quite possibly deliberately so and in political bad faith.
In the former belief, they follow the lead of European elites and
policymakers who have confronted serious terrorism in various forms
over decades, such as the Irish Republican Army (IRA), Euskadi Ta
Askatasuna (ETA), and in earlier years such movements as the Red
Army Faction and the Bader-Meinhof Gang. European policymakers
tend to view terrorism less as something to be defeated than as something
to be managed like any other social welfare problem. It is, on that view, a
serious issue of deviancy, but not one of fundamental threat to society or
the state, any more than any other question of crime.14 As to a "war on
terror"--the idea is laughable.' 5 The assimilation of elite American
opinion to this European view is, in considerable part, a shift in the view
of how risks ought to correctly be assessed. 16
The broader American public, for its part, seems to believe both that
the risks are very grave, and that it can afford to be complacent about
them precisely because it believes that government takes those risks so
seriously. The public thereby tends to passivity about continuing to put
terrorism high on its list of priorities, as public opinion surveys show
14. Not in every single instance, that is, at least not rhetorically. Then-French
President Jacques Chirac, in a remarkable speech during his visit to the French Strategic
Air and Maritime Forces at Landivisiau in January 2006, expressed this mentality when
he noted that, while "combating terrorism is one of our priorities ... [o]ne should not,
however, yield to the temptation of restricting all defense and security-related
considerations to this necessary fight .... " See Jacques Chirac, President of the French
Republic, Speech During His Visit to the Strategic Air and Maritime Forces at
Landividiau, L'lle Longue (Jan. 19, 2006), available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/-
wmd/library/news/france/france-060119-elysee0l.htm (last visited Oct. 20, 2008). It was
unsurprisingly widely and quickly repudiated by the European political establishment.
15. See Bruce Ackerman, Response, This is Not a War, 113 YALE L.J. 1871 (2004)
(discussing the voluminous literature believing the "war on terror" to be absurd, and
comparing European and American approaches).
16. Niall Ferguson, The War on Terror Is Not New, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 2001, at
A3 1.
[Vol. 54:505
ASSUMPTIONS IN THE WAR ON TERROR
steady declines in how highly Americans rank terrorism as an issue.
17
Yet, this ironically appears to be because the public believes it does not
need to prioritize it, not because the public thinks the issue is not
important, but because the public believes that the government already
does and will continue to do so. The public out-games itself and so
overlooks the fact that over time in a large and complicated democracy,
politicians reflect the priorities that voters tell them are important.
Moreover, as Goldsmith points out, the public focuses "less on the threat
it cannot see, and more on the things it can," such as "false alarms, the
alienation of allies, terrorist recruitment, misallocated resources, and
diminished American honor."' 8 The public sees costs but takes for
granted benefits.
The question of how to assess risk can carry us in diametrically
different directions-either to the concrete institutional mechanisms by
which threat assessments are made by the intelligence community or,
alternatively, upwards in abstraction to theories of information relation
and screening for relevance, prediction, congruence, convergence, and
verisimilitude. We pursue the latter and start with two of the simplest
dimensions: magnitude and likelihood.' 9
B. John Mueller on Terrorist Threat Magnitude and Likelihood
Political scientist John Mueller has argued to wide media and policy
establishment attention that the risks of terrorism are wildly overstated.
Developing this thesis in various scholarly and policy venues and articles
since 9/11, he has most recently pulled the argument together in his 2006
book, Overblown: How Politicians and the Terrorism Industry Inflate
National Security Threats, and Why We Believe Them.
20 Despite the
breathless title and popularly aimed prose style, the book makes an
aggressive intellectual argument that the threat to the United States
presented by terrorism, particularly the possibility of catastrophic
17. "One month after 9/11, 85 percent of the American public believed that another
attack was likely to happen in the near future; by the summer of 2007, this figure had
dropped to 40 percent. During this same period, the percentage of the country that saw
terrorism as the nation's most important problem dropped from 46 to 4 percent."
GOLDSMITH, supra note 4, at 187.
18. Id. at 188.
19. Of the distinctions between these two risk dimensions, early in my tenure as the
first general counsel to George Soros' Open Society Institute foundation, Soros presented
me to a meeting of several hundred civil society activists in Eastern Europe by saying,
"Mr. Anderson is the foundation's lawyer-he advises me of catastrophic risks of
extremely low likelihood."
20. JOHN MUELLER, OVERBLOWN: How POLITICIANS AND THE TERRORISM INDUSTRY
INFLATE NATIONAL SECURITY THREATS, AND WHY WE BELIEVE THEM (Free Press 2006).
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terrorism using weapons of mass destruction, is so low *as to obviate
anything that might constitute a "war" on terror. 21 It is something to be
managed through policing and relatively modest intelligence work, in the
United States and abroad.
The policy implications are the familiar ones: so much investment in
counterterrorism is a waste of resources; it wrongly sets the tradeoffs
between security and liberty; it is counterproductive, because many of
the more radical actions in the war on terror counter-radicalize people
into terrorism or the support of terrorism; and the radical and
counterproductive war on terror persists because it is in the political
interests of politicians and the economic interests of what Mueller calls
the "terrorism industry.
' 22
These are contentions that, on the one hand, are comforting to those
who would like to move political conversations to other issues now that
9/11 has receded to the background-issues of domestic policy, the
economy, health care, and other kinds of foreign policy questions such as
genocide in Darfur.23 Mueller, it should be said, is far from merely an
incendiary or debunking journalist; he is a highly regarded political
scientist and security scholar of many decades standing.24 On the other
hand, it is striking to see just how sweeping Mueller's claims are when
laid out, so to speak, end-to-end. Here is a sample of his introductory
bullet point assertions, in case one would like to test one's intuitive
reaction to believing, as Mueller asserts, that the threat is not really so
very large:
21. See generally id.
22. See id.
23. Mueller might profitably have quoted Mademoiselle Mathilde de La Mole, telling
her brother and his friends in an aristocratic drawing room in Paris of 1830, fearful of a
return of the Revolution and the Terror: "And so, gentlemen ... you will be haunted by
fear all your lives, and afterwards people will say of you: 'It was not a wolf, it was only a
shadow'." STENDHAL, THE RED AND THE BLACK, 314 (Moya Longstaffe rev. and ed.,
Moncrieff trans., London Wordsworth Editions 2001) (1830).
24. Although, it should be said, Mueller's earlier career reflected much the same
views about the Cold War-in particular, that the West and Reagan overreacted. See,
e.g., JOHN MUELLER, RETREAT FROM DOOMSDAY: THE OBSOLESCENCE OF MAJOR WAR
(Basic Books 1989), John Mueller, The Essential Irrelevance of Nuclear Weapons:
Stability in the Postwar World, 13 INT'L SECURITY 1, 55-79 (1988), John Mueller, The Art
of a Deal: No Rewards for Iraqi Aggression, Apiz. REP., Dec. 16, 1990, at C1. Mueller's
accommodationist instincts were on display in the first Gulf War. Overblown is, in many
important ways, continuous with Mueller's overall conception of international security,
long predating the threat of Islamist terrorism. See generally MUELLER, supra note 20.
That accommodationist framework might have be seen as wrong in the Cold War, and is
still seen as wrong today. If the United States had followed the policies suggested by
Mueller's Cold War era work, we might still be in it.
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" In general, terrorism, particularly international terrorism,
doesn't do much damage when considered in almost any
reasonable context....
" The likelihood that any individual American will be killed in
a terrorist event is microscopic.
" Just about any damage terrorists are likely to be able to
perpetrate can be readily absorbed. To deem the threat an
"existential" one is somewhere between extravagant and
absurd....
" Lashing out at the terrorist threat is frequently an exercise in
self-flagellation because it is usually more expensive than
the terrorist attack itself and because it gives the terrorists
exactly what they are looking for.
" Chemical and radiological weapons, and most biological
ones as well, are incapable of perpetrating mass destruction.
* The likelihood that a terrorist group will be able to master
nuclear weapons any time soon is extremely, perhaps
vanishingly, small....
" Although additional terrorist attacks in the United States
certainly remain possible, an entirely plausible explanation
for the fact that there have been none since 2001 is that there
is no significant international terrorist presence within the
country.
" Policies that continually, or even occasionally, focus entirely
on worst-case scenarios (or worst-case fantasies) are unwise
and can be exceedingly wasteful.
" In fact, much, probably most of the money and effort
expended on counterterrorism since 2001 (and before, for
that matter) has been wasted.
" Seeking to protect all potential targets against terrorist attack
is impossible and foolish. In fact, just about anything is a
potential terrorist target.
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" Terrorism should be treated essentially as a criminal problem
calling mainly for the application of policing methods,
particularly in the international sphere, not military ones.
" Because terrorism probably presents only a rather limited
threat, a viable policy approach might center around creating
the potential to absorb its direct effects and to mitigate its
longer range consequences while continuing to support
25international policing efforts, particularly overseas.
The reason for my offering this recitation is in part because it is so
comprehensive a statement of the skeptics' claims and such a reassuring
one, particularly when it tells us that the risk of a terrorist group
managing to master nuclear weapons any time soon is "vanishingly
small." 26 But should we believe him on all or most of these strenuous
propositions?
Mueller is perhaps most devoted to the proposition that international
terrorism does not do "much damage when considered in almost any
reasonable context., 27 It is, in other words, a proposition that the damage
wrought by transnational terrorism, even if it occurs as it did on 9/11 and
.even if it occurs on a semi-regular basis, is simply not all that great, on
reasonable measures. Government and what Mueller calls the "terrorism
industry" have severely inflated the estimations of likelihood and
magnitude.
What are (some of) the measures of magnitude, according to
Mueller? Well, the number of "people worldwide who die as a result of
international terrorism is generally a few hundred a year, tiny compared
to the numbers who die in most civil wars or from automobile
accidents., 28 Even including the 9/1l attacks, Mueller dismisses the risks
by noting that the number of Americans killed by international terrorism
since the late 1960's "is about the same as the number killed over the
same period by lightning, or by accidents caused by deer, or by severe
allergic reactions to peanuts., 29 There are many similarly dismissive
comparisons scattered throughout the book. Mueller makes a critique of
the magnitude of counterterrorism efforts on the grounds that the
magnitude of terrorist harm is small, as compared with a wide variety of
social harms, measured either annually or over several decades.




29. Id. at 13.
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One sees where this critique comes from and where it goes, and of
course it is not irrelevant. Tradeoffs involving resources and outcomes
require comparisons and weighing up of opportunity costs. But the point
Mueller nowhere addresses is that these comparisons are only as relevant
as the points of comparison are relevant. As a form of consequentialist
reasoning, it turns quickly into a reductio ad absurdum leading to social
quietism, because no effort at preventing any particular harm will turn
out to be worth the trouble. After all, by some comparison, there is
always something worse that one ought to be preventing. Opportunity
costs are not opportunity costs unless they correspond to a real
opportunity. There has to be a plausible scenario in which addressing one
is actually about acting, or not, with respect to the other. Opportunities-
only genuinely plausible and real opportunities-are the relevant
comparison for comparing opportunity costs.
One might additionally suppose that through serial, iterative
comparison we ought to arrive at the worst thing and seek to prevent that,
and then gradually work our way down the list. But of course human life
is not like that-not merely because it is not "practical" in a dispersed
world of billions and billions, but more fundamentally because we in fact
value multiple and plural things. There is no arriving at a maximum harm
to be prevented ahead of all else, and even if we were able to determine
such a maximum harm, the conditions of human life are such that we
must promote and prevent many different things all at the same time.
This is obvious. But the form of analysis that Mueller engages in (and
which is enthusiastically taken up by various journalists of good repute
including, for example, The Atlantic Monthly's James Fallows) 30 slides
30. See, e.g., James Fallows, Declaring Victory, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Sept. 2006,
available at http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200609/fallowsvictory (last visited Oct. 20,
2008) [hereinafter "Declaring Victory"]; see also James Fallows, Act as if Mueller Is
Right: Responses to 'Is There Still a Terrorist Threat?': the Myth of the Omnipresent
Enemy, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Sept. 7, 2006, available at http http://www.foreignaffairs.org/-
special/9-11 roundtable/9-1 Iroundtable fallows (last visited Oct. 20, 1008) [hereinafter
"Act as if Mueller Is Right"]. Fallows' version of this argument in magazine journalism
attracted much attention in large part because of its insouciant cynicism-insincerity as
policy, a call to announce victory in the war on terror while essentially giving up on it.
See generally id. His Atlantic Monthly accounts aroused, in my recollection, much
admiration from liberals who at the time had decided to drop foreign policy idealism as
something like a neoconservative con game. See Declaring Victory, supra. What I called
at the time the "new liberal realism" found Fallows' tough, amoral realism viscerally
appealing; liberals, it seemed, had grown tired of forever having to worship at the
Wilsonian church of idealism, and seized the opportunity to slip the leashes of their
human rights minders to hold a little Carnival of realism, reveling in such hitherto
benighted realist principles as security first, then human rights and democracy, maybe;
proclaiming that authoritarian strongmen, including Saddam, can be good things; and
accommodation of bad regimes and rulers under the rubric of containment. See generally
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quickly past the question of multiple human goods that, even on
consequentialist reasoning alone, human beings must pursue on behalf of
themselves and others.
C. Moral Agency Constraints on Agentless Risk Comparisons
Opportunity cost is not the only criterion important to establishing
what constitutes a relevant comparison, although it is the most digestible
within the terms of homo economicus instrumentalism. 31 Less
assimilable but still crucial are certain moral constraints upon relevant
comparisons.
The first moral constraint upon comparison of relative magnitudes
goes to the issue of intentionality and human agency. Ordinarily, we
evaluate harm differently when it is caused by intentional human agency,
particularly with criteria of culpability attached, than we do
unintentionally caused harm. It is not irrelevant that Mueller formulates
his criteria of likelihood and magnitude to include, even to emphasize,
natural events such as being struck by lightning. One might, as well,
include earthquakes and volcanic eruptions and asteroid strikes. It might
easily be the case, of course, that one or another of these natural
catastrophic occurrences or accidents might cause more harm in the
aggregate than terrorism. Let us accept Mueller's figures on a death for
death basis. It is also true that societies must undertake difficult cost
benefit analyses, on a discounted probability basis, with respect to
preventing harms caused by highly contingent natural events, such as
earthquakes. All the same opportunity cost questions can be raised about
them as with any social harm.
Although we seek to protect against these harms, even at the cost of
diversion of resources away from preventing intentional human agency
harms, it seems uncontroversial as a social fact that people regard the
two categories as morally distinct. We give distinct analyses of the
proper resources that ideally ought to be devoted to each. This is no more
than to make the sociological observation that our society is morally
id. As the neoconservative democracy project, with its presumption of a wormhole, as it
were, directly from Democratic Elections to the Land of All Good Things, unraveled and
frayed, liberals decided that rather than retake the idealist high ground, it would be
more-really, there is no better word-fun to turn hardened, cynical realist. Both Mueller
and Fallows fit within this political trope. For a discussion and sharp denunciation of the
"new liberal realism," see Kenneth Anderson, Goodbye to All That: A Requiem for
Neoconservatism, 22 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 277, 293-98 (2007); see also Kenneth
Anderson, U.S. Counterterrorism Policy and Superpower Compliance with International
Human Rights Norms, 30 FORDHAM INT'L L. J. 455, 466-70 (2007).
31. Meaning, more or less, that it can be easily graphed.
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deontological in social organization and psychological conviction. Our
moral evaluations include resource tradeoffs with great attention to non-
moral consequences, but they also take into account moral agency, moral
rights and duties of moral agents, and do so as a separate matter. One
may argue that this is irrational and that we should confine ourselves to
some strictly consequentialist calculus, but it is surely unexceptional to
32say that this is not how we do things.
Meaning, that is, that we do not act as strict consequentialists even in
ordinary public life-even when not undertaking such extraordinary
efforts as the war on terror. Consider how Mueller's analysis might apply
to our society's ordinary efforts at criminal justice, even absent a war on
terror or the threat of terrorism. One could just as easily apply Mueller's
analysis to many of our uncontroversial institutions of criminal justice,
institutions that occupy resources that quite possibly, on a strictly
consequentialist calculus, would turn out to be unjustified, especially
considering how badly our system of criminal justice actually functions.
Why do we expend the resources we do on murder cases, for example,
when, after all, that same funding could better be spent on child
vaccination or health care or any number of other things? Mueller's
analysis is striking mostly for its reliance on a general form of
consequentialism-needed, however, in order to reach his very strong
conclusions regarding the irrationality, and wrongness of, the war on
terror specifically. Plainly, this is a form of Ethics 101 discussion that has
been going on for a very long time; the rote response from the
consequentialist is that we must also consider the secondary and tertiary
consequences of failing to police and investigate crime.
The point, however, is that Mueller does not take up the secondary
and tertiary costs or benefits that might accrue to the war on terror. He
stops with simple comparisons-the primary costs of the war on terror
and the primary benefits that might result if those resources were put
elsewhere. Mueller does not specially address the possibility that his
argument might be applied to a vast array of social programs and
particularly instances of justice that, in fact, appear difficult to justify
except as an acknowledgment of the social fact that people have an
independent attachment to a conception of justice, as such. For that
matter, insistence upon justice for its own sake is not merely a social fact
to be observed sociologically, it also happens to be right. Mueller might
respond that he means only excess resources applied to
32. For those looking for an accessible introduction to such basic terms in moral
philosophy as consequentialism or deontology, see Lawrence B. Solum's Legal Theory
Lexicon, available at http://lsolum.typepad.com/legal_theory_lexicon/ (last visited Oct.
30, 2008).
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counterterrorism-but there is nothing special about his argument that
limits it to the war on terror. It is open to the charge that it proves far too
much and undermines the arguments for any agent-culpability institution
of justice.
One might say with perfect consistency, of course as a pure
consequentialist, that as a society we do indeed put too many resources
toward unproductive exercises due to an irrational attachment to our
sense of justice. It is just irrational. But, Mueller gives no indication of
saying that as a general proposition. His target is specifically the war on
terror, and he does not acknowledge the full range of what his argument
could plausibly be read as embracing. Mueller proves, if one is strictly a
consequentialist and shares enough of his factual predicates, that the war
on terror is irrational in its consumption and diversion of social
resources. Mueller, however, fails to acknowledge that one could make
the same argument about any intentionality-based, guilt-based, justice-
based, human agent-based institution. The argument smuggles in an
assumption that in order to be rational, we are all, or ought to be,
consequentialists. Although, it would be more accurate to say that,
socially, we are permissive deontologists-not indifferent to
consequences and not morally bound by them or anything else.
D. Mueller Proving Too Much About Chemical and Biological Weapons
Nowhere is Mueller's hard, but smuggled-in, consequentialism more
at work than in his discussion of the magnitude of harm that he claims is
(un)likely to result from chemical or biological terrorism. 33 He dismisses
the possibility of serious attack on the basis of the factual claim that it is
quite hard to weaponize and deploy chemical or biological weapons
(CBW) in order to produce a catastrophic attack.34
Mueller is perhaps partly correct, if the point of comparison is the
Bush administration's apocalyptic public statements immediately
following 9/11 about the immediate threat of mass destruction by CBW
in the hands of terrorists, and if the assumption is the ability of a terrorist
group to weaponize CBW itself rather than obtain it from a rogue state
and merely serve as the delivery mechanism. But, the limits on terrorist
groups to weaponize CBW will get smaller as technology moves on and
we will soon be a decade beyond the technology available on 9/11.
Mueller discounts essentially to zero the effects of the US war on terror,
including driving Al Qaeda from its safe haven in Kabul along with the
Taleban, and disrupting the long term research, training, and logistical
33. See MUELLER, supra note 20, at 18.
34. Id.
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planning necessary to carry out a large scale CBW attack upon the
United States. Even so, Mueller makes breathtaking assumptions about
matters that are essentially factual uncertainties.
Yet, if the effects of chemical weapons attacks are merely what
Mueller describes, 35 then not only is the US government's agitation
unwarranted-so is the quite extraordinary amount of concern shown in
word and deed and resources by other governments, the United Nations,
the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Human Rights
Watch, the plethora of arms control groups, and everyone who devoted
so many years and vast sums of money and effort to creating and putting
in place two of the most technically worked-out treaties in history: the
Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the Biological Weapons
Convention (BWC). Each of these requires great effort and expense by
chemical and other private industries as well as governments, and each is
celebrated as a great achievement in arms control. This has all involved a
quite lofty diversion of resources, and we should be clear that even if
Mueller's skepticism is aimed at the Bush administration,
36 it all seems
quite equally suited to all the efforts to proscribe CBW.
Put another way, Mueller's cheerful confidence that CBW attacks
are not that big of a deal 37 seems unsustainable unless one takes his
downplaying of the factual consequences (including the strategic
consequences that he does not consider at all) entirely at face value or
unless-more likely-one has already bought into a ruthlessly
puritanical form of consequentialism. Because, why bother if the effects
are as limited and the military and terror uses of the weapons as
circumscribed as Mueller says? 38 The resources and the apparatus for
their prohibition through the CWC and BWC have not been small and
although they are celebrated as politically progressive exemplars of what
international arms control law can achieve, on Mueller's calculus, they
must surely be altogether excessive to the provocation.
For that matter, why stop there? The international campaign to ban
landmines went to extraordinary efforts throughout the 1990s to secure a
treaty of prohibition. 39 Celebrated as a monumental achievement of the
international non-governmental organization (NGO) movement and a
progressive victory for international law, it nevertheless cost large





39. See, e.g., International Campaign to Ban Landmines: History, available at
http://www.icbl.org/campaign/history (last visited Oct. 20, 2008).
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governmental and nongovernmental resources, and for what?40
Landmines were thought in the mid-1990s to produce on the order of
20,000 casualties a year-out of a global population of some six billion
people, let's be plain.4 1 It is a number which, to put it in Mueller-Fallows
terms, is approximately half the number of annual US driving fatalities.42
The same resources put into tsunami detection during the 1990s might
have made a real difference a few years later, and if not then, at some
later point. Moreover, this kind of substitution-tsunami detection,
malaria prevention, etc.-might arguably even pass the opportunity cost
test posed earlier. Global civil society, the international NGOs, might
really have chosen to organize around tsunami detection or malaria
prevention rather than landmines. And yet, even if it does pass the
"actual, not merely alternative world, opportunity" test, it is not wicked
or irrational to put resources into landmine prevention, in no small part
because they are part of a certain intentional human activity.
So Mueller's form of argument relies implicitly on a strong form of
moral consequentialism that proves much too much.43 Moreover, justice
and human agency are distinct categories of value separable from a
general consideration of consequences. They are not immune from
claims of overall consequences, but they are nonetheless a separate
category of things to be valued. We have no reason to apologize for
choosing to put a high resource premium on preventing harms, such as
terrorist attacks, that are products of willful human agency, even above
such events as natural disasters that might (by hypothesis) have a similar
magnitude and likelihood. When Mueller argues from non-agency cases
as a comparison with the war on terror,44 his point is not irrelevant-it is
always something, to consider-but we should not and do not feel bound
by those considerations. To the extent he insists, he sweeps too much in,
and really adopts a covert utilitarianism that is more radical than
American society, at least, is prepared to endorse.45 Traditional ethical
40. The Human Rights Watch Arms Division was one of the founding members of
the International Campaign to Ban Landmines, which spearheaded the NGO ban
campaign during the 1990s. See Kenneth Anderson, The Ottawa Convention Banning
Landmines, The Role of International Non-governmental Organizations and the Idea of
International Civil Society, 11 EUR. J. INT'L L. 1 (2000), available at http://papers.ssm.-
com/sol3/papers.cfin?abstractid=233561 (last visited Oct. 20, 2008) (offering a critical
read of the campaign).
41. See, e.g., International Campaign to Ban Landmines, available at
http://www.icbl.org/problem/what (last visited Oct. 20, 2008).
42. See THE ARMS PROJECT OF HuMAN RIGHTS WATCH & PHYSICIANS FOR HUMAN
RIGHTS, LANDMINES: A DEADLY LEGACY (1993) (discussing 1990s figures).
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theory would say that in deciding to put greater resources toward the
prevention-as well as the investigation and punishment of guilt-a
society acts as a permissive deontologist, not indifferent to consequences
by any means, but not rigidly bound by them, either.
46
We should be careful what we wish for, in other words, in embracing
either the logical structure of Mueller's consequentialism or the factual
assumptions on which he makes his judgment that the war on terror is
not worth it. The argument cuts further and deeper than it looks, or than
Mueller, Fallows, et al., are willing to admit. It finally proves too much.
IV. RELEVANCE AND COMMENSURABILITY
A. Comparisons of Moral Rights and Non-Moral Consequences?
Cost benefit analysis is as simple in principle as it is indispensable in
practice. Take the expected costs and expected benefits, using some kind
of probability discount to determine expectations, and net them against
each other.47 In the case of risks and uncertainties such as terrorism,
which are really all about expected costs, including costs of prevention,
the process is one of determining costs by reference to the two primary
probabilistic dimensions of magnitude and likelihood.
The formal modeling of these dimensions has been thoroughly
worked out in a variety of settings,48 including terrorism, and is not the
primary concern here. The overall concern in this essay is not about
rational modeling as such, but instead about considerations exogenous to
the calculus that change the way in which the model is conceived. The
principal issue is less how to establish expected costs with respect to
their probabilities, than it is how to make genuinely relevant tradeoffs
with respect to the investment of resources in prevention that might be
used to prevent (or accomplish) something else. The issue of relevancy
turns out to be more conceptually difficult than one might have
thought-consider how quickly cracks and fissures arise in Mueller's
49
apparently robust argument-and not from a single source of worry.
46. Traditional ethical theory is also open to reach the same result in practice by some
suitably tweaked version of rule utilitarianism, in which results consistent with our social
notions of justice are accommodated within consequentialist theory. There are other
moral considerations that might also exogenously affect the calculus of tradeoffs in
addressing, but we will take this as exemplary.
47. See, e.g., Introduction to Cost Benefit Analysis, available at http://www.cost-
benefitanalysis.org/ (last visited Oct. 20, 2008).
48. See, e.g., Cost-Benefit Analysis, and Terrorism, available at http://www.becker-
posner-blog.com/archives/2005/09/katrinacost-be.html (last visited Oct. 20, 2008).
49. MUELLER, supra note 20.
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The issues of relevancy arise from multiple directions when trying to
establish the proper bases for comparison-some prudential, some moral,
and some from a still deeper, conceptual issue of commensurability.
Moreover, this concern for justice, desert, and human agency
invokes categories of value and not simply categories of consequences. It
therefore raises an issue of relevant comparisons, and how to make
comparisons. The ways in which background assumptions about the
priorities of moral principles (set against non-moral consequences) color
and condition, in covert ways, arguments over terrorism and
counterterrorism are legion and bitter, and oftentimes do not recognize
the fundamental differences in how to make tradeoffs. For example, for
many human rights activists, natural law theorists, and other (semi-)
strict deontologists, the fundamental point of 'rights' is to override
considerations of consequences: the familiar rubric of rights as trumps.5°
Rights establish a priority ordering of considerations, and consequences
come afterwards. Some of the bitterest arguments over torture, degrading
and inhumane treatment, and coercive interrogation in the matter of
counterterrorism are, somewhere buried within the practicalities,
fundamental disagreements over what takes priority and whether, as a
matter of principle, one does take categorical priority over the other or
whether there even is a categorical.
One way out of this is to reframe all consequences as rights-talk, so
that everything of value is framed as a matter of rights.5' So, following a
familiar rhetorical line since 9/11, 'public safety' is also a matter of
human rights and 'security' is a matter of right-in order to bring it
within the discourse of rights. The obvious problem, of course, is that
now rights are set against rights and supposed trumps set against trumps,
insofar as we are speaking of human rights-and the question of priority
is no less pressing. Put another way, when everything is a right, nothing
is a right. 52 Rights are no longer trumps but have to be prioritized as
50. See generally MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF
POLITICAL DISCOURSE (The Free Press 1991).
51. See, e.g., Kenneth Anderson, The Therapeutic as Rights Talks, 96 COL. LAW
REV., 1062 (1996).
52. This rhetorical move to reframe everything as a right, including national security,
takes its cue from the long history within the human rights movement of reframing
distributive questions, economic matters, etc., as rights. It does not originate with national
security issues on the right; far from it. At least since economic aspirations were
enshrined as rights in the founding UN Covenant on Economic and Social Rights, the
progressive left has set about framing its political agendas as the discovery of new human
rights; a survey of US international law reviews for a ten or twenty year period would
reveal the lengthy history of the discovery of new ways in which to frame distributional
issues as rights in the article titles alone.
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against each other. In that case, what has changed besides the labels?
What has changed in moving to an all-rights discourse? In practical
terms in the United States, what changes is the decision-maker. Many
matters which, in pursuit of the democratic common good, would have
been made as a matter of public policy by the legislature become,
through the legal assertion of rights discourse, matters for decision by the
judiciary which, after all, exists to determine rights. The question of
priority is no less present; but the question of who decides between rights
shifts. Political battles in the United States over the proper role of the
executive, legislature, and courts in establishing the legal framework for
counterterrorism-the rights of detainees at Guantanamo, habeas corpus
and, on the other side, the 'right' of the public to security and safety, and
so on are, to a significant extent, really battles over using rhetorical
shifts-rights talk-in order to shift decision-makers.
At the same time, even most rights-activists do subscribe to a certain
level of permissive deontology-meaning acceptance at least in some
circumstances of the direct consideration of consequences, not re-
mediated as rights or some other moral category. 53 This is so even if,
with a little theoretical pressing and costs to the rhetorical value of
rights-talk itself, they could reach the same results by reformulating
everything in categories of rights and values. Permissive deontology
accepts alteration by expected consequences either when the rights at
issue seem modest enough, or else when the magnitude and the
likelihood of harm become high enough-really, a combination of the
two. But ethical theory is notoriously bad at providing a set of decision
rules for how to determine when this is okay or not, and to what extent.
Rights-talk, without a great deal of special theorizing, really does seem
fundamentally at odds with tradeoff-talk: and yet the comparisons called
forth by a permissive deontology require that, within our ordinary
conceptions of justice and ordered liberty, we consider both rights and
consequences. With enough special pleading, tradeoffs, proportionality,
marginality, the whole structure of cost benefit analysis, can be made
more or less consistent with one other in result. Much of this theorizing,
however, at least in politically fraught and highly disputed matters of
counterterrorism, seems to consist of ad hoc rationales that do not so
much provide a structure for decision as a rationalization for which
consideration-rights or consequences-one favored in a particular case
in the first place. This is not unfamiliar, of course, from decades of
argument over utilitarian social policy and rights, but today's questions
53. See, e.g., Dentological Ethics, available at http://www.britannica.com/eb/article-
9029972/deontological-ethics (last visited Oct. 20, 2008).
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of terrorism and counterterrorism force the issue in a particularly
unavoidable and, indeed, sometimes ugly way.
B. The Limits of Opportunity Cost Comparison: The Special Case of
Government
Comparisons become therefore difficult and complicated. They are
much deeper and much subtler than we might have thought. It is not
quite as we thought: figure out expected costs and expected benefits,
alter them to reflect our values, net them against each other, and compare
to other "relevant" possible courses of action. We might have profound
differences about how factually to evaluate certain expectations, and we
might value certain things differently, and so we might come to quite
different conclusions. In principle it all seemed fairly easy; but in the
end, not so easy as that. Our calculus of comparison might have to weigh
moral values versus non-moral consequences. It might also have to
weigh moral values against moral values. It might have to weigh the
special moral category of rights against other values, or against non-
moral consequences. And, in the case of terrorism, it might have to do so
against very high stakes.
What decision theory is able to persuasively instruct us in these
matters and command wide adherence at a sufficient level of
concreteness? None that I know. One narrow conclusion I draw from this
is one of intellectual attitude within our acrimonious public debate.
Given that we lack a broadly accepted theory for how to deal with
multiple goods and values, it is not a good idea to argue practical policy
in the way that Mueller does,54 in a way that covertly presumes precisely
such a theory (and which then intermingles it with a great many factual
predicates, thus giving it a luster of descriptive authority).
Certainly an attitude of intellectual dismissiveness-which so much
of this literature on all sides tends to affect-is scarcely warranted given
that dissimilar, indeed incommensurable social goods are widely
acknowledged as desirable, even necessary, yet there is no similarly
widely shared view on how, or in some cases even whether, to make
tradeoffs among them. This is not an intellectually overwhelming
point-we could dress it up with a lot of theory about overlapping
consensus and so on, but it hardly seems necessary. Still, given the
curdled nature of much of the public debate, it bears stating.
Now, shift away from the debate over multiple values, non-moral
consequences, and rights to a different problem in 'weighing up.' This is
54. MUELLER, supra note 20.
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the question of 'relevancy' of comparisons, or the general question of
commensurability. We start with a form of cost benefit analysis (that, in
the case of bad events such as terrorism, becomes a downside risk
analysis), and out of which resource investments to minimize or prevent
the risk must be weighed against opportunity costs. As observed earlier,
however, a comparison of resource investments-whether to put
additional resources into counterterrorism or some other activity-
depends in large part upon whether the alternative is genuinely an
opportunity denoting an opportunity cost, or something more akin to
possible alternative worlds. We are not going to take resources that could
be spent on treating the cut finger in Washington DC and divert them to
AIDS in Africa. But when is the comparison absurd, and when is it not?
One way to think about this problem is to appeal to economic models
that address institutional opportunity cost decisions. A private business
firm engaged in capital budgeting provides an ordinary example because
private business firms must make many opportunity cost comparisons.
Yet the private firm example does not offer a guiding principle.
Why not? Capital budgeting for a firm typically does not need to
deal directly with the problem of radically differing opportunity costs
because the question of alternative possible investments for comparison
is ordinarily self-restricting. The universe of possible comparisons is
self-constraining. Opportunities that go far outside the existing firm's
capabilities (usually loosely indicated by its lines of business) bring with
them risks and uncertainties that themselves must be absorbed into the
calculus. The opportunity costs posed, for example, by a uranium mining
company considering entering the lingerie business are perhaps the
business equivalent of the cut finger-AIDS in Africa comparison. It
might follow a "conglomerate" strategy and go into the fashion business.
But market judgments of the rational limits of such diversification will
be factored into the comparisons so as to constrain the universe to a set
of apples-apples profit criteria. The uranium company's universe is self-
policing. In the business environment, firms are mostly self-policing
because the risks and uncertainties speak for themselves. This is not so
with public, social institutions in which the plural goods are for the less
self-constraining.
Thus, while this self-limitation renders private firm capital budgeting
inapposite for truly general relevancy criteria, government stands in a
quite different and perhaps more useful position in giving an example of
how to evaluate opportunity costs. The private firm's self-limiting
mechanism does not apply in the case of government. The reason, long
developed in the literature of public administration, is that the nature of
government is that it must attend to plural needs. It cannot specialize
(including, crucially, by abandoning whole lines of business activity as
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unprofitable) in the way that firms can. There is a range of functions that
a government is expected to perform: provide security, manage the
macro-economy, ensure social welfare, and guarantee many other public
goods. Without entering into the endless debate over how wide or how
narrow those functions ought to be, even the ones that nearly everyone
agrees upon, such as monetary policy or national security, require
tradeoffs that are not, on their face, obviously commensurable. We look
to cost benefit analysis and opportunity cost comparisons. Yet many of
the goods at issue are sufficiently dissimilar that comparisons are
difficult and often do not convince us that they make sense.
55
So if the nature of large, democratic government in advanced
democratic economies is that it must perform and be responsible for
plural and dissimilar functions, it is not available for government to
decide, for example, that it is going to do social security, but not national
security. Or that it is going to provide elementary education, but not
money. The relevance and commensurability problems of tradeoff are
unavoidable for government. What happens? Ordinarily government can
resolve the apples-to-oranges comparison problem by creating a second
order mechanism, a procedural mechanism that resolves the problem
without making claims as to substance. Democratic processes, or interest
group politics, or whatever procedural mechanism the polity has in place,
make these determinations on whatever substantive basis, rational or
irrational, prudent or imprudent, thrifty or profligate, they can make
them.
However they are made, these budgeting and resource allocation
decisions are different from the opportunity cost decisions of private
firms, because, unlike government, there is no necessity that a private
firm be involved in any particular kind of business. In a trivial sense,
dealing with terrorism and counterterrorism is no different than any other
resource allocation function in government. There is a second order
mechanism, the complex decision-making structures of a complex,
bureaucratic democracy, for dealing with counterterrorism as with any
other issue. But what we seek here is not the procedure by which
decisions are made, but instead to establish the substantive rational
criteria on which they should be made.
How can we characterize the second order mechanisms? Public
management theory accepts that although government, unlike private
55. Outsourcing, in the sense of having some private party provide the public good, of
course does not make the resource tradeoff go away, so long as the government pays for
it. And simply giving up on the public good is also a decision as to tradeoffs-marking to
market, so to speak, at zero-at least so long as the good in question is indeed regarded
as a public good.
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firms, has certain, possibly incommensurate, obligations among which it
nevertheless must make investment tradeoffs, it can make decisions
about tradeoffs so long as those activities are in the ordinary course of
public business. 56 'Ordinary' here takes on, however, two distinct
meanings. One is that so long as there is some reasonably legitimate,
reasonably democratic process (or process of assent) in place for
determining the tradeoffs, then the rationality of the actual tradeoffs
themselves is not so very important.57 It accepts, that is, that the final
answer is one of under-determination of rational criteria for establishing
the tradeoffs at issue, meaning that it is procedurat rather than
substantive.
The second is that the process adopted is 'ordinary' in the sense that
it is not 'single catastrophic event'-driven. It is 'ordinary' in the sense
that the decisional process can be revised over time, according to lessons
learned, some positive and some negative, but none of them a 9/11 or
worse. We can afford to be under-determined as to rational decision
criteria provided that we can change and adjust as we go. We can afford
a learning curve. If, however, the necessary object of policy is to prevent,
under all circumstances and without fail, an event from happening, a
casuistical approach to adjusting the process to lessons learned is
inadequate. Under the condition of what we might call 'event specific
catastrophism,' the modestly ad hoc nature of under-determined public
management criteria is insufficient as a matter of policy. Neither private
nor public managerial theory is adequate to terrorism and
counterterrorism because they can neither provide substantive criteria for
establishing relevant opportunity costs among value-plural public goods
nor provide a procedure that can make those determinations without the
prospect of grave and unacceptable mistakes.
The under-determinacy is thus evident. Private firm capital
budgeting theory is inadequate to the decisional task because it, unlike
the management of counterterrorism, can safely assume rational
relevancy of the opportunity costs that it considers. Public management
theory is inadequate because while it is able to assume a relaxed posture
with respect to the relevancy of its comparisons and commensurability,58
it has no firm grounds to commit to an independently determinable
'rational' answer. But that is only because the second-order
56. "Ordinary" in the sense of ongoing, changeable, correctable, and procedural.
57. It might even be considered simply a matter of preferences not subjected to
rational argument, except out at the margins of "no national security" or "no monetary
policy."
58. This is because over time, its procedures will come to democratically legitimate
answers, even if they turn out to be mistaken on occasion and so shift over time.
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proceduralism to which it is committed instead is formulated with respect
to ordinary, ongoing operations of government. 'Event specific
catastrophism' alters that assumption, in ways that force us to seek
genuinely (i.e., independently defensible) rational points of comparison
in order to establish rational levels of investment in countering uncertain
catastrophic risks precisely because they are catastrophic. Business as
usual-second order procedures-will not suffice.
One can argue, to be sure, that they do indeed suffice and that our
ordinary decision-making procedures should not be altered on this
account. Many serious people take this view in the multiple debates over
tradeoffs of safety and civil liberties: no military commissions, but
instead Article III courts; or no coercive interrogations or renditions; or
no indefinite detention of aliens without charges, and so on. Insofar as
they reach such positions through Kantian absolutism, or even some
softer version of rights-as-trumps, they have found, for themselves at
least, a substantive response to the question of criteria for weighing
incommensurables. One may of course agree or disagree, but for our
purposes the question is posed to those who do not avail themselves of
deontological trumps. Our concern is with those who grapple with
genuine pluralism: values versus consequences, or values versus other
values and those who accept in principle the idea of tradeoffs in the first
place. Finally, those who accept Muller's reasoning depend upon his
unstated commitment to a general consequentialism that is far from
universally shared. 59 If we do not simply sign on to absolutist rights, or
an equally absolutist utilitarianism, but accept the problem of pluralism,
then we face the general problem of comparison. What does it mean for
something to be 'commensurable' at all?
60
V. CONCLUSION: OF STRATEGY AND TACTICS
This essay has made three over-arching points.
First, US responses to terrorism-whether one calls it generically
counterterrorism policy or a war on terror or anything else--depend on
certain underlying assumptions, what this essay has called the
'assumptions behind the assumptions' in counterterrorism. Cost benefit
analysis is a core 'assumption behind the assumptions' lying below the
surface of operational counterterrorism policy.
Second, cost benefit analysis itself depends upon further
assumptions. These further assumptions have a large impact on the
59. MUELLER, supra note 20.
60. See RUTH CHANGE, INCOMMENSURABILITY, INCOMPARABILITY, AND PRACTICAL
REASON (Cambridge University Press 1997).
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otherwise apparently straight-forward comparative approach to weighing
up policy options in the face of risk and uncertainty. These further
assumptions embedded, but not necessarily transparent, within cost
benefit analysis include, among others, the difficulties in ensuring that
the analysis compares apples-to-apples or oranges-to-oranges. In a social
and political world of multiple and plural values, this is far more difficult
than it would be, for example, in the case of financial analysis in the
private marketplace, where, at least in principle, comparisons can be
reduced to the common denominator of money. Not all values in our
social world can be reduced to a common denominator.
Moreover, although cost benefit analysis can provide important data
for making moral judgments about such fraught matters as how to
respond to terrorism, it does not finish the moral discussion-at least not
for most people in American society. Beyond whatever advice cost
benefit analysis might give, most people are 'permissive deontologists'
when it comes to matters of how to respond to purposive and intentional
actions such as murder and terrorism. For the same reason-justice-we
devote far greater resources to the pursuit of criminals than cost benefit
analysis might plausibly justify, we are also inclined to devote more
resources to responding to and preventing terrorism. Arguments from a
cost benefit analysis that suggest that we devote too many resources to
counterterrorism would also apply with equal force to the argument that
we allocate too many resources to the criminal justice system for the
pursuit of ordinary criminals.
Similar observations about the overreaching tendency of cost benefit
analysis, under an apparently simple exterior, can be made with respect
to 'commensurability.' As noted earlier in the essay, this is a point
closely related to, but still different from, the observation that we, as a
society, embrace plural values that are not reducible to one common
denominator. Cost benefit analysis relies upon the comparison of
'opportunity costs,' but the comparison of opportunity costs depends
upon them being genuinely available 'opportunities'-social choices that
might genuinely be made. Whether an opportunity is genuinely an
opportunity in our existing social world or not is a question of social fact
about the world. Arguments from cost benefit analysis that rely upon
opportunity cost comparisons involving socially or politically
implausible opportunities-opportunities from another, alternative
world, so to speak, not our real one-are of much less importance than
their conclusions might seem. Again, such arguments overreach.
This essay has focused on the writings of one particular analyst, John
Mueller, and his book Overblown, as an example of the deeply flawed
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use of cost benefit analysis.6' It is a more than fair point to respond that
using Overblown as the case study in the ills of cost benefit analysis is
the worst kind of strawman argument. On the one hand, the book has
been widely noticed, cited, and relied upon for argument by important
journalists and policy analysts, such as journalist James Fallows.62 On
the other hand, serious academic students of cost benefit analysis would
recoil from the sweeping, breezy assertions and conclusions made by the
book, on all the objections raised above and perhaps more. The reason
for making it the target in this essay is not in order to suggest that it
stands in for much more serious cost benefit analysis. It does not.
But, Overblown is illustrative of the basic errors that can and might
arise from failing to take into account the underlying assumptions of cost
benefit analysis-and the illustration is far easier to see in a crude form
of cost benefit analysis, rather than a more careful and hedged version of
it. The point of this essay is not to undermine the case for cost benefit
analysis in responding to terrorism-far from it-but instead to help
define the subtle limits upon the method and the matters that must be
drawn out carefully and explicitly in order to ensure that comparisons are
indeed comparable, particularly with respect to counterterrorism policy.
It is therefore useful to start with a view, claimed on its own terms to be
generated by cost benefit analysis, that America's approach to terrorism,
far from trying to wipe out its perpetrators or even devote much in the
way of resources to prevent it from taking place, might instead merely
"center around creating the potential to absorb its direct effects," and
"mitigate its longer range consequences. 63 The very boldness of the
claim, and the fact that the claim reached such radical conclusions
through the application of cost benefit analysis, puts squarely on the table
what the method can do, cannot do, and what assumptions it relies upon.
There are sophisticated and defensible applications of the method to
counterterrorism, 64 but as a starting point for considering the method's
assumptions, sometimes the crudest, least methodologically protected
example provides the most illustrative value (provided that the critic
understands that the baby of cost benefit analysis cannot, therefore, be
thrown out with the bathwater, as it were).
One final observation can be made about cost benefit analysis and its
underlying assumptions. It is an observation particularly pertinent to its
application to terrorism and counterterrorism. The nature of cost benefit
61. See MUELLER, supra note 20; see, e.g., SUNSTEIN, supra note I.
62. See generally Declaring Victory, supra note 30; Act as if Mueller Is Right, supra
note 30.
63. See MUELLER, supra note 20, at 5.
64. See, e.g., SUNSTEIN, supra note 1.
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analysis is essentially reactive. It is-and this point deserves an essay all
its own with respect to national security and terrorism policy-a method
of evaluation, a mechanism for evaluating proposed courses of action,
not for generating them. 65 As a method, it is, in Philip Bobbitt's phrase,
"relentlessly tactical. ' ' 66 Cost benefit analysis does not propose solutions;
it evaluates solutions offered by other processes. It is not a strategic form
of thinking.
The fundamental limitation of cost benefit analysis, in other words,
lies not so much in its own assumptions, but in the limits of what it does.
The long-term US response to terrorism-counterterrorism policy, the
war on terror, however one wants to frame it-requires a strategic form
of thinking. We will not agree on what the strategy should be, which is
why, as a democracy, we have majoritarian processes to sort out the
agreements and disagreements, and come to a form of action. Cost
benefit analysis can provide indispensable information for arguing over,
and finally formulating, strategic approaches. But it will not come up
with those strategies in the first place. And that, in the end, is its true
limitation.
65. Thanks to a discussion with my colleague, law and economics scholar Jonathan
Baker, on this point.
66. Kenneth Anderson, Home Fronts, TIMES LIT. SUPP. (London), July 25, 2008, at 8.
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